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The Shortcomings of Corporate Accountability in Post-Conflict Colombia: Land, Rivers 
and Animals 
By: Isabella Ariza Buitrago1 and Luisa Gómez Betancur2 
 
Abstract 
Harms resulting from a fifty-year-old conflict in Colombia were out of all proportion. Clashes 
between organized armed groups, such as army troops, guerillas, and paramilitary groups resulted 
in countless violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. However, the 
emergence, degradation, effects and continuation of the conflict have shown that, beyond a clash 
of armed groups, the war has been underpinned by a “logic of dispossession, exploitation, and 
domination.” This logic used plundering devices over many territories and bodies. In the shadows 
of the strife, non-armed actors, such as business people, corporations, and politicians, were also 
responsible for and benefited from the war. Economic actors participated in land grabbing, forced 
displacement and the fraudulent and illegal possession of the land that historically belonged to 
Indigenous People, campesino and afro-communities. This same logic showed that, along with 
human bodies “as the first territory targeted for dispossession,” lands, animals, rivers, and whole 
ecosystems were severely impacted. Despite this recurring logic and its devices, the transitional 
justice architecture is ill-equipped to deal with past and present dispossession, exploitation, and 
domination. This Article explains transitional justice’s stringent limitations for delivering justice 
and remedy for victims of corporate abuse, such as a weakening anthropocentric and corporate-
centric approach that does not properly address harms against territories, rivers, animals, or 
ecosystems. However, this piece also reflects on the endeavors that both the transitional justice 
institutions themselves and civil society at the domestic and international levels have made to 
 
1 Human Rights lawyer with an L.L.M. from Harvard Law School. She served as a Harvard Public Service Venture 
Fund legal fellow at the Corporate Accountability Lab. Between 2016 and 2019, she was a litigation attorney based 
in Bogotá, Colombia. She currently clerks at the Compliance Oversight Unit of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. 
2 Constitutional lawyer with a M.A.S. in Transitional Justice, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law from the Geneva 
Academy. She served as a legal adviser at the Colombian Constitutional Court, a researcher for the Essex Transitional 
Justice Network, and a Brain Trust Member of Corporate Accountability Lab. Recently, she worked for the Victims 
Participation and Reparation Section at the International Criminal Court, the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights, and the American Bar Association. Currently, she is a Consulting Attorney in CIEL’s People, Land, and 
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effectively respond to the systems of dispossession of the Colombian conflict and, most 
importantly, to their victims. 
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“The project before us is not an extensionist one (expanding the definition of the human to allow a few 
racialized groups or preferred ape species in) but rather a reconstructive one (reimagining humans, 
animals, and nature outside of systems of domination).”  
Claire Jean Kim 
 
Introduction  
The headline of a Colombian newspaper article reads: “A biologist goes bird-watching with 
the men who kidnapped him.”3 The article tells the story of a man that feels hope for the future of 
the country and fraternity with former FARC-EP combatants. The article also mentions that 
Colombia is the most biodiverse country in the world per square kilometer, reports that fourteen 
new species of animals have been discovered in the Amazon region, and suggests that ecotourism 
has plenty of potential for enhancing the economy.4 This idyllic view of a post-conflict Colombia 
contrasts with the fact that the country continues to have one of the world’s most unfair land tenure 
structures, which has led many landless campesinos to colonize environmentally protected areas.5 
It is also at odds with the fact that deforestation increased by 44% in 2016, the year the Peace 
Agreement between the Colombian government and FARC-EP was signed.6 
Many challenges regarding the implementation of the Peace Agreement between the 
Colombian government and former guerrilla --now political party-- FARC-EP remain. Although 
a paradigm shift in environmental matters is essential for permanent and sustainable peace, and 
 
3 All translations are ours. Pardo Ibarra, Tatiana. “El biólogo que observa aves con los hombres que lo secuestraron.” 
El Tiempo. June 1st, 2019. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/vida/medio-ambiente/el-biologo-que-observa-
aves-con-los-hombres-que-lo-secuestraron-369514 
4 Id. 
5 Note that the opposite phenomenon is also common: local governments have declared as “protected forests” lands 
that campesino settlers have inhabited for years. See Ángel, G., Posada, V., Olaya, C., González, L., Sánchez, S., 
Jerez, C., Melo, L. 2019. Lineamientos para la política pública participativa. Parques con Campesinos. Carta Acuerdo 
FAO-ANZORC. Bogotá. 
6 Further, “Landowners who try to return to their abandoned plots are facing an unexpected problem. Jungles that 
were once cleared for farmland grew back during FARC-EP occupation; the government has claimed much of this 
land as a natural resource that cannot be used for farming or timber. This has left hundreds of thousands of people 
with no source of income if they choose to move back to their land, especially because most of them do not have 
papers to prove ownership.” Reardon, Sara. “FARC-EP and the forest: Peace is destroying Colombia’s jungle — and 
opening it to science.” Nature. 12 June 2018. Available at: nature.com/articles/d41586- 018-05397-2 
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although victims are well aware of the harm and damage that animals suffered during the war,7 
transitional justice mechanisms do not focus on environmental justice, and animals are mentioned 
only once in the Agreement —to make sure that families have animals in their land—.8 Polluted 
land and rivers, and harmed and killed animals are almost completely absent in post-conflict 
conversations. Similarly, victims of corporate abuse are not properly represented in the transitional 
justice process because its tribunal, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (“SJP”) does not have 
mandatory jurisdiction over corporations that participated either directly or indirectly in the 
conflict. 
A transitional approach to justice after the conflict should recognize that along with armed 
groups, non-armed actors, including business people, corporations, and politicians, have also been 
responsible for and benefited from the war. By ignoring the role that non-armed actors played 
during the armed conflict in Colombia, one might be at risk of simplifying the scope of the harm 
or the motivations and vehicles that contributed to the outbreak or continuation of violence. As the 
identity of economic actors and their powerful networks are identified in the complex puzzle of 
the armed conflict, it becomes clearer that the Colombian conflict can be understood and accounted 
for through a logic of “dispossession”9, “exploitation”, and domination”10 over bodies and 
territories. 
 
1. Devices of Dispossession, Exploitation, and Domination 
The armed conflict attempted to conquer and wound not only human bodies but also nature 
and territories. This logic is well-framed by a group of rural women that were victims of gross 
human rights violations and participated in storytelling processes with the Colombian Truth 
Commission: “The [material] dispossession was accompanied by forces that have intimidated 
 
7 Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Mujeres, coca y guerra en el Bajo Putumayo. Bogotá: Publicaciones 
Semana 2012, p. 276. Available at: http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/El- Placer-
mujeres-coca-y-guerra-en-el-Bajo-Putumayo.pdf 
8 Final Agreement for a Stable and Durable Peace, 2016. “Article 4.1.3.6. a) For the family nuclei of the cultivators 
linked to the crops of illicit use: Establishment of home gardens and delivery of minor species with their due technical 
support, provision of supplies and food for the animals, according to the preference of each family nucleus.” (“Artículo 
4.1.3.6. a) Para los núcleos familiares de los cultivadoras y cultivadores vinculados a los cultivos de uso ilícito: 
Establecimiento de huertas caseras y entrega de especies menores con su debido acompañamiento técnico, provisión 
de insumos y alimento para los animales, de acuerdo con la preferencia de cada núcleo familiar.”) 
9 As conceptualized by Nichols, Robert. "Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession," Political 
Theory 2018, Vol. 46(1) 3–28, available at: https://criticaltheory.northwestern.edu/mellon-project/critical-theory-in-
the-global-south/sub_projects/theft-is-property,-nichols.pdf  
10 As conceptualized by Ko, Aph and Syl Ko. Aphro-ism: Essays on Pop Culture, Feminism, and Black Veganism 
from Two Sisters. Lantern Publishing & Media, 2017. 
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campesinas. In addition to the territory, our bodies have also been subject to dispossession and 
have been used as weapons of war through sexual violence and other types of violence that left 
deep traces in our daily lives. Many women have gone through this situation of feeling that neither 
their body nor their land are worth anything”.11 They also refer to forced recruitment of their 
children: “When legal and illegal armed actors take away from us our children, this is 
dispossession.”12 
Plundering and domination devices were used over many territories. Along with human 
bodies “as the first territory targeted for dispossession,”13 land, animals, rivers, and whole 
ecosystems enlarged the list. All of them were severely impacted by war and, as a result of over 
five decades of war, ecosystems and wildlife in Colombia experienced significant environmental 
pressures and damage. Remote zones where armed groups settled overlap with the most 
biodiversity-rich areas in the country and the world.14 Some investigative reports indicate that in 
2013 40 percent of the presence of illegal groups was recorded in National Natural Parks, areas 
designated for conservation purposes.15 Camp settlement and the development of illegal activities 
in these areas involve the usage and processing of resources, which under conflict conditions could 
not be deemed sustainable.16 According to official statistics, 58 percent of deforestation between 
1990 and 2013 took place in war zones.17 Among the main identified causes of deforestation are 
illegal mining, crops used for illicit purposes, illegal logging, forest fires, and extensive cattle 
ranching.18 In the mid-2010s, 56 percent of deforested areas were transformed into grass cover for 
livestock activities.19 Land grabbing and the development of extractive projects and agribusiness 
 
11 “Nuestros cuerpos, además del territorio, también han sido objeto de despojo”. December 17, 2020. Comisión para 




13 Sánchez, M. (2021). Cartografías del despojo: saqueo, explotación y guerra contra los cuerpos afro-campesinos en 
los Montes de María (Colombia). Palobra, 21(1), 5-23. 
14 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014–2018 50 (2015). 
15 Los parques: de las balas a la paz, Semana. Sept. 21, 2013. Available at: 
https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/los-parques-de-las-balas-la-paz/358371-3  [https://perma.cc/YS3S-
NYWF].  
16 César Rodríguez Garavito et al., La Paz Ambiental: Retos y Propuestas para el Posacuerdo, Dejusticia 19–20 (Jan. 
2017).  
17 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Conpes 3850: Fondo Colombia en Paz 15 (2015); Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación, Dividendos Ambientales de la Paz 5 (2016) 
18 Environmental Investigation Agency, Condenando el Bosque: Ilegalidad y falta de gobernanza en la Amazonía 
Colombiana 6, 16 (2019). 
19 See Rodríguez Garavito et al., supra note 16, at 29. 
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have also accelerated deforestation and degradation of forests.20 Mercury dumping, as a 
consequence of illegal gold mining, has polluted water, soil, and air.21 In 2011, Colombia had the 
world’s highest per capita mercury pollution.22 According to the UN Environment Programme in 
2018, Colombia is one of the highest emitters of the toxic chemical, after Indonesia and Perú.23 
There is also severe environmental degradation due to attacks on oil pipelines by rebel groups, 
particularly the National Liberation Army (ELN). Since the 1980s, it is estimated that more than 
four million oil barrels have spilled over land and water basins, reaching almost 800 rivers and 
streams between 2009 and 2015.24 As a strategy of the fight against drugs, herbicides --composed 
of glyphosate-- were heavily sprayed by air over illicit crops: about two million hectares have been 
sprayed since the mid-1990s.25 Because aerial spraying of this chemical is difficult to perform in 
a controlled manner, wildlife and farming activities suffer destruction too. The Constitutional 
Court in Colombia has already discussed the negative impacts of these herbicides for human 
rights.26  
Up until 2014, about 50 percent of towns in the country were impacted by illegal mining, 
and extractive activities took place in 28 percent of natural protected sanctuaries.27 Violence in the 
most biologically diverse sites in Colombia --such as the Amazon and the biogeographical Chocó 
and Catatumbo28-- made conservation activities virtually impossible.29 Armed actors used 
strategies such as the placement of landmines,30 killings, and threats against rangers in natural 
 
20 Environmental Investigation Agency, supra note 18.  
21 Lorenzo Morales, Peace and Environmental Protection in Colombia: Proposals for Sustainable Rural Development, 
Inter-Am. Dialogue 10–11 (2017), Available at: http://www.thedia-logue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Colombia-
report-Eng_Web-Res_Final-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA38-6FU3].  
22 Paul Cordy et al., Mercury Contamination From Artisanal Gold Mining in Antioquia, Colombia: The World’s 
Highest Per Capita Mercury Pollution, 410–11 Sci. Total Env’t154, 155 (2011). 
23 UNEP & AMAP, Technical background report to the global mercury as-sessment 2018 3–34 (Oct. 2, 2019). 
24 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
25 Ministerio de Justicia y ODC, Reporte de drogas de Colombia 75–79 (2015). 
26 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 13, 2003, Sentencia SU-383/03; Corte Constitucional 
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2017, Senten-cia T-080/17; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional 
Court], abril 21, 2017, Sentencia T-236/17; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 8, 2017, 
Sentencia T-300/17 (documenting many harms and human rights violations resulting from the aerial application of 
herbicides whose active component is glyphosate). 
27 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, supra note 17, at 19. 
28 See Rodríguez Garavito et al., supra note 16, at 12–13. 
29 María D. Álvarez, Forests in the Time of Violence: Conservation Implications of the Colombian War, 16 J. 
Sustainable Forestry 47, 63 (2003). 




sanctuaries31 to discourage institutional presence.32 Additionally, the government’s interests are 
focused on ending armed struggle, so the military budget is often prioritized above conservation 
efforts.33 In 2019, military expenditure was more than 14 times the budget for environmental 
protection in Colombia.34 In 2020, it increased to almost 17 times.35 This is a brief account on how 
non-humans bodies have also been subjected to plundering devices and how every territory 
provides a testimony of the “logic of dispossession, exploitation, and domination” that has 
characterized the war in Colombia and behind which corporate abuse has been present. 
Jungles, rivers and animals should be protected, not based on a fear of human extinction or 
by taking a simple conservationist approach, but rather because they form part of a wide and 
complex ecosystem, which affected communities are also a part of. While trying to find ways to 
end a fifty-year-old conflict, the Colombian government was able to imagine ways in which former 
combatants could be welcomed to mainstream society. But, at the same time, it kept relying on the 
same judicial mechanisms that perpetuate corporate impunity. This paper explores some ways to 
achieve redress, even when the law seems to be tailored to fit companies’ economic interests and 
to leave out restoration for victims of corporate abuse, rivers, animals and land. In the following 
pages, we will explore how conflict has benefited extractive economic actors, how post-conflict 
appears to continue to do so, and how civil society has organized to find accountability beyond the 
official transitional justice mechanisms. 
 
2. Conflict and Extractivism: Rivers, Animals and Corporate Impunity 
Like other wars and conflicts, the history of Colombian conflict can be read as an effort to 
dominate what is considered wild. Left-wing guerillas and the jungles they inhabited for decades 
 
31  InfoAmazonía,  Guardaparques de la Amazonia Salen de áreas Protegidas por Amenazas, El Espectador (Feb. 24, 
2020), https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/me-dio-ambiente/guardaparques-de-la-amazonia-salen-de-areas-
protegidas-por-amenazas-ar-ticulo-906118 [https://perma.cc/87DR-MDYH].  
32 This phenomenon is identified in Jeffrey A. McNeely, Conserving Forest Biodiversity in Times of Violent Conflict, 
37 Oryx 142, 148 (2003). 
33 This phenomenon is identified in Thor Hanson et al., Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots, 23 Conservation Biology 
578 (2009). 
34 According to the budget classification showing types of activities or services in which national funds will be 
allocated (“Clasificación Funcional”), in 2019, COP 11,620 thousands of millions (mm) was expended in the defense 
sector while COP 788 mm was expended in environmental protection services. Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito 
Público, Presupuesto Ciudadano 2019 24 (2018), 
http://www.pte.gov.co/WebsitePTE/Documentos/PresupuestoGeneralNacion2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R37-
762H].  
35 In 2020, the above trend remains. Only COP 750 mm is invested in conservation efforts while COP 12,349 mm is 




were imagined by mainstream society as just that: wild. Through violent strategies that sometimes 
benefited corporate interests, campesinos were dispossessed from their land in rural areas of the 
country, making Colombia the country with the highest number of internally displaced people.36 
Rivers were consistently and systematically polluted, their water streams were dominated by the 
horror of violence and used as avenues to dump bodies and disappear people. All armed actors of 
the conflict harmed or used animals in violent ways. This section takes a brief look at those 
domination dynamics and shows the ways in which, even after the official end of the conflict, 
many of those dynamics persist. 
 
2.1. Extractivism and Land Grabbing 
 During the pandemic year37, Colombia’s Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and 
Environmental Studies reported that 171,685 hectares of forest, mostly in the Amazon region, had 
been destroyed, an increase of over 8 percent compared to 2019.38 Through land grabbing, 
economic actors often set up “valuable agricultural operations” such as “cattle rearing and African 
palm oil cultivation.”39 This is a decades old phenomenon: before the signature of the Peace 
Agreement extractive projects “benefited from the dynamics of dispossession and the rural 
development model,” while the government approved the dispossession by “providing a ‘lifeline’ 
to the corporations that have grabbed state-owned lands (baldíos) illegally.”40 During the peak of 
 
36 Colombia has the highest number of internally displaced people (IDPs), according to the United Nations. See 
https://www.unhcr.org/colombia.html. In its annual report, the UNHCR, the agency in charge of monitoring forced 
displacement, said Colombia had 7.7 million IDPs.  
37 After a harsh pandemic year, more than 43% of Colombians are living in poverty. Earlier this year, protesters took 
to the streets demanding changes to tax and labor reforms that would further impoverish the middle and lower classes. 
Women, young people, Indigenous communities, Afro-Colombian people, and union leaders demanded Iván Duque’s 
government to step up the implementation of the Peace Agreement and guarantee their right to protest. Indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian communities fighting against corporations like Cerrejón demanded an end to continuous 
harassment and death threats. During the protests, riot police inflicted grave injuries on hundreds of people “under the 
pretext of restoring order.” Independent journalists suffered attacks, social justice lawyers were threatened, and union 
leaders had to flee the country after receiving death threats. In this context, environmental defenders fighting corporate 
abuse, like Jani Silva --who has received several death threats--, are asking for protection. For more detail, see Informe 
Final De La Misión De Observación Internacional Por Las Garantías De La Protesta Social y Contra La Impunidad 
En Colombia, published in October, 2021, available at: https://ddhhcolombia.org.co/2021/10/07/informe-final-de-la-
mision-sos-colombia/  
38 Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales (Ideam). "Boletín de Detección Temprana de 
Deforestación (DT-D)". Subdirección de Ecosistemas e Información Ambiental. Sistema de Monitoreo de Bosques y 
Carbono (SMByC). Available at: http://documentacion.ideam.gov.co/openbiblio/bvirtual/023891/22BOLETIN.pdf 
39 Insight Crime. "Land Grabbing: Tracing and Targeting the 'Invisible' Threat Destroying Colombia’s Forests." 
March 25, 2021. https://insightcrime.org/news/land-grabbing-tracing-targeting-invisible-threat-destroying-colombia-
forests/  




paramilitary violence (1996-2006) more than 3,100 people were killed and 55,000 campesinos 
were forcibly displaced. Displacements meant that valuable land became cheap: a paramilitary 
combatant declared in a Justice and Peace court that “Everything was done because of the land, 
which is rich in coal. This generates a lot of money, that's why all this displacement happened. A 
land in conflict is worth nothing: where there are dead and displaced people, one could buy the 
hectare for 150 thousand colombian pesos.”41 As a result of the forced and massive displacement, 
together with the fraudulent purchase and sale of property, mining companies acquired a 
significant part of the land stripped from displaced campesino communities.42  
The most explicit symptom of the coincidence between land grabs and the mining boom 
in Magdalena Grande43, a region rich in coal, is that a significant part of exploitation licenses 
granted to large coal companies currently overlaps with lands claimed by victims of land 
dispossession and forced displacement. Drummond, for example, has an exploitation license that 
includes 57 properties in Chiriguaná, Cesar. The same US company is also authorized to exploit 
an area covering 81 farms known as Mechoacán, Casacará, and El Platanal in Codazzi, Cesar. 
Over these lands, victims have filed dispossession complaints. Prodeco, a company that represents 
Glencore’s operations in Colombia, owns an exploitation license that covers eight lands with 
restitution claims by campesinas and campesinos in El Prado, Los Manguitos, San Rafael, and 
Plan Bonito (Cesar). Likewise, Carbones Serranía is a company that was authorized to exploit coal 
in an area that includes 25 properties in La Jagua, Cesar, that were allegedly illegally 
appropriated.44 
Despite the formal demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
paramilitaries in 2006, the victims of human rights violations, community leaders, and union 
activists continue to be threatened, intimidated, and attacked. Neo-paramilitary groups continue to 
 
41 VerdadAbierta.com, 2010, diciembre 13, “La versión de Samario sobre la Drummond y los paras.” 
42 “El desplazamiento forzado no solo fue utilizado como estrategia de guerra, sino que también coincidió con los 
intereses económicos tanto de los paramilitares como de las élites económicas locales y las empresas que estuvieron 
directamente involucradas en los desplazamientos o se beneficiaron de los bajos precios de la tierra y la garantía de 
permanencia en ella” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013, 71; Juzgado Adjunto al Juzgado Quinto Penal del 
Circuito Especializado de Medellín 2013 cit. in Sánchez, Nelson Camilo et al. Cuentas claras: El papel de la Comisión 
de la Verdad en la develación de la responsabilidad de empresas en el conflicto armado colombiano, Dejusticia: 
Bogotá, Feb. 2018). Available at: https://www.dejusticia.org/publication/cuentas-claras-empresas/  
43 "El Magdalena Grande" is how the region of the Colombian Caribbean coast is known, which runs from the 
Magdalena River to the Guajira peninsula and which until the 1960s comprised the current departments of Magdalena, 
Cesar, and La Guajira.. 
44 “La maldita tierra: Guerrilla, paramilitares, mineras y conflicto armado en el departamento del Cesar”. CNMH, 
Agosto de 2016. Available at: https://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2016/maldita-
tierra/la-maldita-tierra.pdf  
9 
operate in Cesar after the Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras was enacted in 2011, 
threatening and intimidating “post”-conflict land restitution claimants. 
These overlapping patterns repeat in zones currently dominated by extensive cattle 
ranching and agribusinesses but that historically belonged to campesino and afro-communities. 
This is the case of the Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó afro-communities in the municipality of El 
Carmen del Darién that were massively displaced at the hands of a criminal plan hatched by 
paramilitary groups, the Colombian National Army, and economic actors. Under counter-terrorist 
slogans, military and paramilitary forces broke into their territories and, in joint operations, widely 
known as “Cacarica and Genesis Operations,” spread terror and forcefully displaced more than 
3,500 people45 in just three days.46 After some years, when many of these afro-communities 
attempted to return to their homes, they found cattle ranchers, African palm oil cultivation owners, 
and logging businesses taking possessions of the lands through fraudulent and illegal means.  
Although Chapter I of the Peace Agreement47 contains a “Comprehensive Rural Reform,” 
that intends to alleviate the effects of the conflict and to change the conditions that enabled 
persistent violence in Colombia, such as the issue of land access and use, the unfair concentration 
of land with agricultural potential, and the exclusion of the rural population from land ownership, 
the transitional justice framework that subsequently developed the Peace Agreement fails to tackle 
the logic of domination described in this Section. In substance, the law continues to benefit 
corporate abuse and law enforcement is weak when it comes to protecting campesinos and their 
territories. The absence of transitional mechanisms for corporate accountability and a persistent 
corporate-centric approach hinders comprehensive reparation. Colombia’s transitional justice 
design left corporations out. As we will explain, some gaps in the law let corporations impune for 
profiting, benefiting from, or directly financing the conflict. 
The Peace Agreement created a complex transitional justice system which includes the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) as its justice component. “One innovative characteristic of the 
SJP is that its competence is not limited to state actors and members of armed groups, but also 
 
45 Caso De Las Comunidades Afrodescendientes Desplazadas De La Cuenca Del Río Cacarica (Operación Génesis) 
Vs. Colombia. Judgement, Noviembre 20, 2013, at 46. Available at: 
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_270_esp.pdf  
46 Cacarica: 23 años construyendo paz. Marzo 13, 2020. Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la 
Convivencia y la No Repetición. Available at: https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/cacarica-23-anos-
construyendo-paz  
47 Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, Colom.-FARC-EP-EP, Nov. 
24, 2016,  
http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/ Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LF8X-ZR8N]  [hereinafter Final Agreement]  
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includes [civilians] or third party actors.”48 As it was crafted in the Peace Agreement, the SJP had 
the ability to summon civilians, that included politicians and economic actors, such as cattle 
ranchers, businessmen, or farmers that although did not form part of the armed forces did profit, 
benefit from, or directly financed it. However, in a 2017 decision, the Colombian Constitutional 
Court ruled that the mandatory submission of economic actors to the SJP was unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it violated their rights to a fair and impartial trial, in particular the principle of the 
natural judge.49 Consequently, the court’s solution to this issue was to deprive the SJP of its ability 
to summon these actors.50 In a nutshell, the SJP maintains jurisdiction over economic actors only 
if they voluntarily present themselves before the system, otherwise they will continue under 
jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal justice system. The problem with this outcome is that the 
ordinary justice system has historically guaranteed impunity for economic actors, then, the latter 
have no incentives to appear before the SJP. “Considering the difficulties and poor results that 
have characterized the investigations of the ordinary prosecutors thus far, it seems that few 
businessmen will have sufficient incentives to present themselves before the [SJP] and that its 
contribution to clarify their role in [violations of human rights or humanitarian law] and hold them 
accountable will be rather limited.”51 
This outcome set up a discouraging scenario for victims of corporate abuse. Their hope 
was rooted in the SJP’s innovative powers to summon economic actors, and, based on the dynamic 
of the transitional justice system, to compel them to contribute to justice, truth, reparations, and 
non-repetition in exchange for legal benefits. The jurisdiction of the SJP over third party actors, as 
originally crafted, offered a genuine ability to combat de facto impunity. 
Ultimately, the Court's decision privileged the status quo of impunity that has characterized 
economic actors' investigations in the ordinary criminal justice system. To be clear about the 
dimension of the impunity in Colombia, according to the 2020 Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities,52 the Colombian General Attorney informed the Office of the Prosecutor at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) that out of 2.683 cases related to third party actors, only there 
 
48 “Transitional Justice in Colombia”. Essex Law Research Blog. February 8, 2019. Available at: 
https://essexlawresearch.blog/2019/02/08/transitional-justice-in-colombia/  
49 On the Court’s reasoning in this context, see, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-674 de 2017, Bogotá D.C., catorce 
de noviembre de dos mil diecisiete, para. 5.5.2.6. 
50 Ib., para. 5.5.2.11; Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-080/18, Bogotá D.C., 15 de agosto de dos mil dieciocho,  para. 
4.1.6.3; art. 11(1), Law 1922/2018. See also, Jurisdicción Especial Para La Paz, Tribunal Para La Paz, Sección de 
Apelación, David Char Navas, Auto TP-SA 19 de 2018; Bogotá D.C., 21 de Agosto de 2018. 
51 Philipp Wesche, Business Actors, Paramilitaries and Transitional Criminal Justice in Colombia, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, 2019, 13, 478–503. 
52 Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=2020-otp-rep-PE-COL.  
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were 15 judgments, out of which 10 were convictions.53 Simply put, the corporate impunity related 
to the conflict in Colombia overcomes 99.81%. 
 
2.2. Rivers: Pollution and their Moral Contamination 
“The war in Colombia has trampled the rivers to their full extent, as often happens on 
battlefields”.54 As land, Colombian rivers and water streams have also been subjected to systems 
of domination. They have been systematically polluted, but also morally or symbolically 
contaminated. The World’s Water, a website dedicated to providing information to protect and 
preserve fresh water, has tracked and categorized events related to water and conflict since the late 
1980s.55 Between 1990 and 2019, 48 events took place in Latin America and the Caribbean, out 
of which 20 occurred in Colombia and were associated with the armed conflict. An important part 
of these events relate to dynamiting oil pipelines causing serious streams and rivers contamination, 
as well as bombing water supplies, aqueducts, and treatment plants mostly by guerillas. Only in 
2015, the oil spills into rivers put at risk the food and economic security of approximately 84,000 
farmers, indigenous people, and fishermen who depend on these ecosystems; left 160,000 
inhabitants without water, and caused irreparable damage to fauna and flora, threatening 30 species 
of fish and 25 of mammals, some of them at risk of extinction, such as the tapir, the armadillo, the 
leopard, the manatee, the ñeque and the white-tailed deer.56 
Rivers have also been continuously poisoned with heavy metals as a consequence of legal 
and illegal mining. Economic actors have pursued the extraction of Colombian gold. With a violent 
and illegal initial extraction, companies then export it very easily outside of the country.57 The 
Quito River, which twenty years ago was at the heart of one of the most biodiverse regions in the 
world, is now the cause of death of children that result from intoxication with mercury-polluted 
 
53 Despite these alarming numbers of impunity, the ICC Prosecutor, Mr Karim A. A. Khan QC, on October 28, 2021, 
concluded the preliminary examination of the Situation in Colombia with a Cooperation Agreement with the 
Government charting the next stage in support of domestic efforts to advance transitional justice. Available at: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1623  
54 Ignacio Piedrahita, “La verdad sobre los ríos”. Publicaciones Semana S. A. January 2020. Available at: 
https://comisiondelaverdad.co/images/Libro_La_verdad_de_los_rios_31012020v.pdf  
55 Available at: https://www.worldwater.org/water-conflict/  
56 Tatiana Pardo, “Los ríos que las FARC-EP pintaron de negro”, El Espectador. June 27, 2015. Available at: 
https://www.elespectador.com/ambiente/los-rios-que-las-FARC-EP-pintaron-de-negro-article-568911/  
57 "Una mafia devastó la selva en Chocó," August 24th, 2021. La liga contra el silencio. “Las empresas luego lo 
exportan, de manera informal casi siempre, a Estados Unidos, Suiza y Canadá, según un informe publicado en febrero 
de 2021.” Available at: https://ligacontraelsilencio.com/2021/08/24/una-mafia-devasto-la-selva-en-choco/  
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water.58 Gold mining powered by mercury turns rivers into inhospitable places for fish, produces 
an “irreversible damage” to the environment, and generates the “massive displacement of fauna.”59 
Currently, it is estimated that due to mining processes, more than 80 rivers in Colombian are 
polluted with mercury.60 For centuries, rivers in Colombia have been a route and refuge for 
countless communities who have found in them sacred places, food, company, transportation, and 
homes. Quite simply, rivers have been places where life flourishes. However, due to devices of 
domination, “rivers have also been and are witnesses of the worst massacres in the history of the 
armed conflict. Thousands of dead have rested in their waters and for years hundreds of 
communities have mourned them.”61 Water streams have been stained by the forced 
disappearance, a crime with staggering numbers in the country.62 Dumping persons and bodies 
into rivers to disappear them was carried out by all actors of the conflict, but paramilitary groups 
used this disappearing practice the most. 
In just five rivers of the country (Magdalena, Cauca, Putumayo, Atrato, Sinú, and San 
Jorge) 5.907 victims of forced disappearance have been confirmed .63 Finding them has been 
almost an impossible task: 1,080 bodies have been recovered.64 Also, in the Chocó Region 
(Buenaventura), communities have identified "clandestine mass graves" into the water, in estuaries 
and mangroves – “acuafosas.” This type of violence has caused a moral or symbolic poisoning of 
rivers. They were no longer a place where life flourished, but rather, a vehicle of death. 
“Acuafosas” and “blood” rivers have caused fear, terror, and a wound in the relationship that afro-
communities had with their territories. Estuaries were the livelihoods for communities; they 
 
58 "Una mafia devastó la selva en Chocó," August 24th, 2021. La liga contra el silencio. “Según informes de la 
Defensoría del Pueblo, retomados por la Corte Constitucional, en las comunidades indígenas de Quiparadó (pueblo 
Wounan) y Juinduur (pueblo Emberá), que habitan en el bajo Atrato, tres menores de edad murieron y otros 64 se 
intoxicaron por ingerir agua contaminada en 2013 (...) En 2016 el Ministerio de Salud, el Instituto Nacional de Salud 
(INS) y la Universidad de Córdoba (UC) desarrollaron un estudio con 1.096 personas de 11 municipios en Chocó. El 
47,3 % (519) estaban intoxicadas con mercurio, según los parámetros establecidos por el INS. Este químico también 
afecta a los peces.” Available at: https://ligacontraelsilencio.com/2021/08/24/una-mafia-devasto-la-selva-en-choco/  
59 "Una mafia devastó la selva en Chocó," August 24th, 2021. La liga contra el silencio. “Las empresas luego lo 
exportan, de manera informal casi siempre, a Estados Unidos, Suiza y Canadá, según un informe publicado en febrero 
de 2021.” Available at: https://ligacontraelsilencio.com/2021/08/24/una-mafia-devasto-la-selva-en-choco/  
60 Alberto Mejía, En busca de la descontaminación de los ríos afectados por mercurio. March 3, 2020. Available at: 
https://www.iagua.es/blogs/alberto-mejia-arango/busca-descontaminacion-rios-afectados-mercurio-2  
61 Comisión de la Verdad, “Los ríos también tienen una verdad que contar”. January 31 de 2020. Available at: 
https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/los-rios-tambien-tienen-una-verdad-que-contar  
62 According to official records, between 1958 and 2017, there were more than 83.400 forced disappearing victims. 
63 Laura Cerón y Lorena Luengas. “Ríos colombianos: vertientes de vida y muerte”, November 30, 2019. Available 
at: https://todoesciencia.minciencias.gov.co/opinion/rios-colombianos-vertientes-de-vida-y-muerte  
64 Rutas del Conflicto. Proyecto Ríos de Vida y Muerte. “Más de mil cuerpos recuperados en 190 ríos”. Available 
at: https://rutasdelconflicto.com/rios-vida-muerte/especial/mil-cuerpos.html  
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generated economic and food sustainability, and a space where families could spend weekends 
and where young went swimming. But this changed: “One of my sons has problems going to sea 
because when he goes fishing, he would see black bags spouting blood.”65 "The river has been 
contaminated morally. How do you clean a river from its history? How do you take away from the 
river the moral contamination it has carried?"66 
 
2.3. (Ab)use of Animals in War67 
Past and present exploitation of nature is the cause of human and non-human animal 
displacement and harm. One could imagine that animals thrived in the jungle during the conflict 
—in the space where law could not reach, and corporate extractivism was impossible—. However, 
this depiction is highly utopic: in the nearly fifty years of internal conflict, FARC-EP was a severe 
human presence in the jungle, and animals were displaced, battled, often eaten, feared, and 
sometimes used as weapons for the war. 
The war in Colombia took the lives of many human and non-human bodies. FARC-EP 
killed animals to eat them and used them as weapons to attack their enemies. Becoming experts in 
eating jungle animals meant making sure they could survive and be in a position of advantage 
compared to other humans, who had no such training. But their relation to animals was originally 
mediated by political views. In their initial political enterprise, before their project got deeply 
entangled with the economy of drug trafficking, FARC-EP viewed animals as a way to assure 
subsistence and independence for rural families.68 As Crespo analyzes, many questions remain 
unanswered: “How many animals and whole species have been displaced from their territories? 
What are the numbers of animals killed in bombardments or mines? How many animals have been 
used as shooting practice, to desensitize the actors in the conflict to death and torture?”69 It was a 
known practice for FARC-EP to use animals as bombs: “Animals, bicycles and corpses served as 
 
65 Carolina Ávila Cortés y Valentina Parada Lugo. “Los mapas de la desaparición forzada en Buenaventura.” El 
Espectador. April 30, 2021. Available at: https://www.elespectador.com/reportajes/los-mapas-de-la-desaparicion-
forzada-en-buenaventura/  
66 Laura Cerón y Lorena Luengas. “Ríos colombianos: vertientes de vida y muerte”, November 30, 2019. Available 
at: https://todoesciencia.minciencias.gov.co/opinion/rios-colombianos-vertientes-de-vida-y-muerte  
67 This subsection is based on Ariza, Isabella, “Transition in Colombia: An Opportunity to Repair Animals in Cities 
and Animals in War,” recipient of the Harvard Law School 2020 Animal Law and Policy Writing Prize, unpublished. 
68 This conception of land ownership and animals rearises in the Peace Agreement of 2016: the only direct allusion to 
animals in the Agreement is in regard to them being provided to families that used to cultivate illegal crops. Animals 
as victims of war are left out of the Agreement. As property, FARC-EP demanded their more equal distribution 
between owners and the campesinos who worked the land. 
69 Crespo, Carlos A. “Territorios de paz para los animales y el ambiente”. El Turbión. 2 de junio de 2016. Available 
at: https://elturbion.com/13421  
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explosives. Horses, donkeys, ambulances, balls and even the bodies of children ended up being 
turned into bombs.”70 
In territories where paramilitarism ruled, the setting is no longer the jungle. It is still rural 
and far from the cities —far enough so that the absence of the state did not impact mainstream 
society—, but semi-industrialized and quite populated (by persons that, in exorbitant amounts, 
would become displaced). The actors are also different: paramilitarism arose as a phenomenon that 
responded to the guerrilla’s force with harsh, private, illegal armies. In settlements that 
paramilitary groups invaded, they brutally killed dogs that were spotted in the street after curfew, 
and forced women to kill their animals and cook for them. 
All armed actors of the Colombian conflict made slavery uses of the women’s bodies: they 
used them to carry out chores and domestic tasks. In the case of paramilitary groups, “they stole 
their animals and then forced them to cook them, they recruited them in situations of domestic and 
sexual slavery.”71 Paramilitarism has a strong attachment to cattle raising,72 and the inhabitants of 
Rincón del Mar (in the Atlantic Coast of Colombia) said that in the public meetings that 
paramilitary leaders held to communicate their coercive rules and regulations, they referred to 
them as ‘pigs’, ‘cattle’, ‘animals’. Additionally, paramilitaries had a number of reasons to kill 
dogs: first, they wanted to eradicate the non-compliance of the curfew. Second, animals littered. 
The kind of society that paramilitaries wanted to impose resembled a military dictatorship: “This 
was much more related to the type of town, the social order desired by the paramilitaries (...) They 
killed the dogs that were on the beach, so we had to tie them up.”73 Third, whenever paramilitaries 
started a confrontation, dogs barked, alerting the presence of strangers. As soon as they barked, 
paramilitaries shot them. 
If FARC-EP used animals as weapons, paramilitaries used them as allied perpetrators. All 
over the country, paramilitary leaders were trained to kill peasants using serpents, tigers, 
 
70 Guerrillas exploded corpses, houses, animals, and cars to attack and contain their enemy, the national army. Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica. “Capítulo IV: Los impactos y los daños causados por el conflicto armado en 
Colombia” in Informe General. Bogotá: 2014. Available at: 
centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/capitulos/basta- ya-cap4_258-327.pdf  
71 Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Mujeres y guerra: Víctimas y resistentes en el Caribe colombiano. Bogotá: 
Editora Aguilar, Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara, S. A, 2011. p. 132. Available at: 
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2011/Informe_mujeresy guerra.pdf   
72 “For paramilitaries the appropriation of displaced territories is part of the objectives of military security and the 
creation of sanctuaries for the business of drugs, and in some cases for the development of agricultural plantations of 
long term or extensive cattle raising.” (Duica et al., 75) 
73 Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Mujeres y guerra: Víctimas y resistentes en el Caribe colombiano. Bogotá: 
Editora Aguilar, Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara, S. A, 2011. p. 128. 
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crocodiles, lions, snakes, caimans, vultures.74 This was a method meant to disappear the corpses 
of their victims. A woman of Puerto Asís, in the Amazon of Colombia, remembered that in nearby 
lakes “[Paramilitaries] had alligators. They said that they would feed us to those animals.”75 A 
victim interprets this perverse practice as “a manifestation of not wanting to bury, but to 
disappear,”76 but a paramilitary combatant confessed that they used rattlesnakes, one of the most 
poisonous in the world, to murder peasants, because “as International Humanitarian Law says that 
after three deaths there is a massacre, our purpose was no to be blamed for so many massacres. 
We used snakes because these deaths were counted as accidents of nature.”77 
The Declaration of the Women's Movement Against War in Putumayo stated: “The 
Colombian Government must ensure and guarantee the right to human, animal and plant life!”78 
This declaration proposes that human and non-human animals being part of a whole is essential, 
not accessory, to peacemaking in Colombia. Animal cruelty, in war and outside of it, continues to 
be battled through a punitive response. This is true both in Colombia and in the United States.79 In 
a transitional justice regime, moving away from strictly anthropocentric and corporate-centric 
solutions could bring reconciliation that transcends the criminal/innocent, city/jungle, and 
human/nature dichotomies. By blurring these lines and through an adaptive ethics of mutual 
avowal80, both FARC-EP ex-combatants and persons that incur in animal abuse could be reinserted 
from the margins. 
 
3. Accountability Beyond Transitional Justice 
So far, this paper explored both the logic of domination and extractivism that characterized 
the conflict and that subsists in the Colombian context. After mapping the lack of mechanisms for 
corporate accountability and acknowledging the variety of harms infringed on bodies and non-
human territories, we will explore what tools are under construction to address this impunity crisis. 
This section examines the strategies that civil society and public interest lawyers have developed 
 
74 Id., p. 135. 
75 Id., p. 276. 
76 Id., p. 48. 
77 Guillén, Gonzalo. “Paras alimentan fieras con los restos de sus víctimas”. El Nuevo Herald. 23 August 2009. 
Available at: https://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america- latina/colombia-es/article1998424.html  
78 Movimiento de mujeres contra la guerra “Campaña por la desmilitarización y recuperación de la vida civil” 
Comunicado de prensa No. 14. Declaración del movimiento de mujeres contra la guerra en su movilización al 
Putumayo. 
79 See Marceau, Justin. Beyond Cages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
80 An ethics of mutual avowal “takes seriously the imperative of challenging domination’s multiple dimensions.” Kim, 
Claire Jean. Dangerous Crossings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.  
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to advance accountability whether within the transitional justice institutions or beyond them. First, 
it describes the efforts to hold corporations accountable in a post-conflict setting. This includes 
strategies within transitional justice, such as relying on the Colombian Truth Commission, and 
outside of it, such as activating civil law mechanisms to find redress for victims of corporate abuse. 
Second, it examines innovations in the legal field such as the rights of nature and its consequences 
for territories, rivers, and animals as victims of the armed conflict. 
 
3.1. Seeking Corporate Accountability for Economic Actors 
As described, the SJP does not have mandatory jurisdiction over economic actors, but 
retains voluntary jurisdiction. Other transitional justice institutions such as the Colombian Truth 
Commission could reveal the role of companies in the conflict.81 Because its mandate entails that 
“in its process of clarifying, the Commission also studies the effects of the armed conflict on nature 
and will seek to identify common patterns and their consequences,” it is expected that the final 
report will include an analysis of the role that corporations played in the conflict.82 Transnational 
companies enjoy the rights granted to them by legal regimes, but few of the responsibilities they 
would have to assume if they were natural persons.83 Although at least nineteen truth commissions 
have addressed corporate responsibility in their reports, and some have explicitly named economic 
actors involved in the conflict, economic actors along supply chains often claim that others, not 
them, are responsible for human rights violations.84 This is the case with energy companies that, 
for example, after purchasing coal from multinational companies operating in Colombia, argued 
 
81 Article 13 of Decree 588 of 2017 provides that the Truth Commission must prepare a final report that “contains the 
conclusions and recommendations of its work, including guarantees of non-repetition.” We understand that the Truth 
Commission does not have “the double mission of reconstructing the truth and doing justice” but rather that of 
investigating “what happened”, “why”, “how” and --just as important-- the “where next?” (Bermúdez Liévano, Andrés 
(Ed. and coord.) Havana debates: an Inside Look. Barcelona: Human Capital Fund for the Colombian Transition, 
Institute for Integral Transitions (IFIT), p. 253, emphasis added. https://ifit-transitions.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Los-debates-de-La-Habana-Una-mirada-desde-adentro.pdf  
82 “En su proceso de esclareciendo la Comisión también estudia las afectaciones del conflicto armado a la naturaleza 
y buscará identificar los patrones comunes y sus consecuencias.” Available at: 
https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/los-rios-tambien-tienen-una-verdad-que-contar  
83 Byrnes, Christopher, Elizabeth Deligio, Brother Anthony Kote-Witah, and Charity Ryerson, ‘We All Stand Before 
History’: Corporate Impunity as a Colonial Legacy—The Case of the Niger Delta 9 de abril de 2019, HHRJ. 
Disponible en: https://harvardhrj.com/2019/04/we-all-stand-before-history/) 
84 “A commission should also consider recommending non-judicial sanctions against those named, such as banning 
them from public positions of authority or from posts in the security or intelligence service, prohibiting them from 
working in a private security firm, and taking away their right to bear arms. While such recommendations could not 
be implemented by the commission itself, they could guide lawmakers toward establishing a strategy for accountability 
and reducing the threat of further abuses by these individuals in the future, outside of the limited possibilities of 
successfully prosecuting them in court” (p. 144). Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and 
the Challenge of Truth Commissions. New York & London: Routledge, 13 de septiembre de 2010. 
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that the “complexity of the coal market” and the “fundamentals of competition law” meant that 
coal could not “be traced back to the beginning of the mining operations or mining company/origin, 
as this isn’t known at the time of purchase.”85 For years, the government promoted, rather than 
regulated, extractive activities. As the size of companies or their production units decreased, their 
influence in the management of the sector decreased as well. Hence, while large-scale industry has 
a high amount of power and influence over all strategic decision-making processes, small and 
medium-sized miners, informal miners, and ancestral and artisanal miners have little to no relation 
to these niches and, consequently, obtain little benefit from public policy.86 These are the sorts of 
findings that the Colombian Truth Commission should integrate and address to imagine adequate 
guarantees of non-repetition. 
Beyond transitional justice, in Colombia as in other parts of the world, civil society has had 
an increasing interest in pursuing civil claims for human rights violations.87 Despite there being a 
clear nexus between corporate behavior and damages, the law of many countries as well as 
international law is ill fit to serve the interests of communities. Because of strict proof standards, 
a narrow understanding of causation, and restricted notions of standing, proving the elements of 
torts —or its equivalent in other jurisdictions—, which is hard enough during times of peace, turns 
into an impossible task. If forcibly displaced, many communities focus on preserving their lives 
and don’t have the time, the opportunity, or the tools, to gather evidence before they leave their 
territory. If harassed or killed, community leaders and their families have trouble attributing the 
conduct to companies because threats and bullets often come from hired assassins.88 And, if 
negatively impacted by environmental harm, communities struggle with proving causation, while 
companies hide behind formally valid environmental licenses and permits.  
 
85 Diálogo Holandés del Carbón. Informe Final (julio de 2013). pp. 8–9. Disponible en: 
www.paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/dutch-coal-dialogue-final-rapport-2013.pdf. 
86 Although this paper did not emphasize the structural problems of mining in Colombia, see in this regard Velásquez, 
Fabio E. "La participación ciudadana en el sector extractivo en Colombia," Bogotá: Editorial Dejusticia, 2021, 
available at: https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/La-participacion-ciudadana-en-el-sector-
extractivo-en-Colombia.pdf (pp. 23, 29). 
87 See the Bonavero Institute’s research project, "Civil liability for human rights violations," description available at: 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/content/civil-liability-gross-human-rights-abuses  
88 According to Javier Giraldo S.J, the acts of these perpetrators can be attributed to paramilitary groups that have 
changed the way they operate. Whereas in the past they used to be formally organized, illegal groups that functioned 
as parallel but state-approved armies, they now often don’t take responsibility for their actions and hide under the 
facade of “regular” crime. See Peña, Pompilio. “Javier Giraldo: La matanza de desmovilizados es una tradición,” 
September 28, 2019, available at: https://hacemosmemoria.org/2019/09/28/javier-giraldo-la-matanza-de-
desmovilizados-es-una-tradicion/  
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For these and other reasons, corporate harm during conflict often goes unredressed. But 
two years ago, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice decided the Machuca case, an exception 
to this rule and the only one of its kind in recent legal history in Colombia. The Court ordered that 
an oil company had to pay economic and moral damages to the Machuca community, which was 
affected by an oil spill that was the result of a bombing conducted by the National Liberation 
Army, a guerrilla force. Considering the country’s conflict and the security measures that the 
company did take, this case could have failed. The parties heavily discussed whether the armed 
group’s conduct should exonerate the company from liability. Traditionally, in civil law 
jurisdictions like Colombia, if an independent third party harms another person and there is no 
vicarious liability, the defendant is usually off the hook. Here, the debate was more nuanced. Both 
the circuit court and the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the company created the risk. 
Although the company could have traced the pipeline elsewhere, it chose to trace it near the 
community, and with this it created a risk that ended up materialized. Having created an 
unnecessary risk, the company was responsible for the Machuca community’s damages. Despite 
the causality chain being relatively long, the Court found the company liable. Other cases may fit 
the pattern that the Machuca case followed. In cases in which companies deviate rivers, and this 
deviation results in damages to communities, causation may be even easier to prove. 
Civil law attorneys are continuously imagining ways to use civil litigation against 
companies for their involvement in environmental and human rights violations during conflict. 
Corporate Accountability Lab, a Chicago-based nonprofit, created a social lab precisely to share 
experiences from Africa and Latin America in battles against companies for their behavior during 
conflict. This social lab is a “cross-jurisdictional, cultural, and linguistic collaboration to protect 
people and the planet from corporate abuse during conflict” and convenes “a diverse international 
group of lawyers and community advocates working towards justice for victims.”89 Corporate 
Accountability Lab also designed a civil litigation skill share exercise where Colombian attorneys 
meet with Global North attorneys and discuss ways to use civil litigation to remedy harms tied to 
corporate abuse during the conflict. According to their analysis, statute of limitations, the difficulty 
of proving causation and finding impartial experts within the reach of the communities played an 
important role in preventing the civil route from being the most common one for impacted 
 
89 Kelly, Avery. "Why We Created a Social Lab on Corporate Accountability In Transitional Justice," March 26, 
2021. Available at: https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2021/3/26/why-we-created-a-social-lab-on-corporate-
accountability-in-transitional-justice  
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communities. They are, however, exploring ways in which these obstacles can be surpassed in 
order to use the ordinary law --and not transitional justice-- in favor of the communities. 
 
3.2. The Rights of Nature: an Approach to Addressing the Harms to Territories, Rivers, 
and Animals as Victims of Conflict 
Despite the limitations of the transitional justice mechanisms, characterized by a persistent 
anthropocentric approach that has hindered victimhood and comprehensive reparation for non-
humans' bodies and territories, some developments by the SJP have intended to fill this gap.  
Currently, Colombian judges have recognized as “subjects of law” more than nine rivers,90 
two national parks,91 and other ecosystems such as high-altitude wetlands (páramos)92 and the 
Colombian Amazon rainforest.93 This ripple effect started in 2016, when a river —the first non-
human body, was recognized as a “subject of rights.” Through Judgment T-622 of 2016, the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia declared the Atrato River had “rights that imply its protection, 
conservation, maintenance and ... restoration.”94 A tutela lawsuit,95 filed by ethnic communities of 
the Atrato River, showed evidence that government entities had violated their fundamental rights 
to their territory and culture. According to the plaintiffs, the lack of institutional control over illegal 
 
90 Tribunal Administrativo [T. Admtivos.] [Quindío State Superior Tribunal], Sala Cuarta de Decisión Quindío marzo 
15, 2019, N. 2019-00024, Tribunal Administrativo del Quindío [T.A.Q] (Colom.). (Quindío River case); 3rd Juzgado 
de Ejecución de Penas y Medidas de Seguridad [Juzg. Circ.] [Third Tribunal of Execution for Penalties and Security], 
Cali, Valle del Cauca  julio 22, 2019-00043 (Colom.) (Pance River case); Sala Cuarta Civil Medellín [T. Superiores] 
[Medellin State Superior Tribunal], Civil Court No. Four June 17, 2019, N. 2019-076 (Colom.) (Cauca River case); 
Personeria Municipal de Ibagué Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y otros,Tribunal Administrativo de Tolima [T. 
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mining activities in the river that overlapped with their ancestral territories was threatening their 
traditional ways of life. In the judgment, the Court highlighted the overlapping between illegal 
mining in the Atrato River Basin and armed conflict: “the rise of illegal mining of gold and other 
precious metals [in the Basin of the Atrato River and its tributaries] has opened up alarmingly—
as a financier of the armed conflict—which is generating worrying socio-environmental conflicts 
that materialize in an indiscriminate struggle for the control of territories and natural resources.”96 
As a result, the region and its communities endured forced displacement, the degradation of 
ecosystems, the reduction of forests, extinction of endemic species and pollution of rivers, among 
other factors that place the natural and cultural heritage of the country at high risk.97 Along with 
these harms caused by illegal phenomena, the high court pointed out that “policies and legislation 
have emphasized access for economic use and exploitation to the detriment of the protection of the 
rights of the environment and of the communities.”98  
“The Court recognized that the government failed to recognize the river as not only an 
ecosystem but also as the territory that enabled communities to develop their cultural rights. 
Accordingly, it failed to understand that there was a “biocultural” relationship between the river 
and local communities worthy of constitutional protection. The legal solution was to recognize the 
river as a subject of rights and to declare that it will be represented by a “Guardians’ Council”, 
composed of one member of the plaintiff communities and one delegate of the Colombian State. 
The Guardians’ Council represents and protects the river in all scenarios. This ruling is a creative 
solution to socio-environmental problems. For years, the government had neglected the Atrato 
River’s territories and marginalized its neighboring communities. Thus, through the creation of 
the Guardians’ Council with decision making power, a novel forum that ordinary law does not 
envision, community participation was strengthened, and an innovative form of environmental 
governance was set up. Interestingly, this governance is in charge of the local population, whose 
on-the-ground experiences and knowledge could provide valuable perspectives about more 
appropriate and sustainable interactions with the Atrato River ecosystem”99: 
Recognizing nature as a subject of law engenders making a claim for the dissolution of the 
dualism between society and nature, a demand to implement alternatives to the fatigued 
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discourse of development, and a vindication for regenerative systems instead of the 
dominant growth economic model. Undoubtedly, the rights of nature expose the 
anthropocentric perspectives of the environmental law and emphasize the need to imagine 
and create [...] strategies that advocate for the indivisible and interrelated links between 
people and nature.100 
Given the recognition of “the rights of nature” for rivers and other non-human entities, one 
may ask whether there is any possibility for ecosystems that endured negative impacts of war, to 
be acknowledged as victims of the armed conflict. If so, could rivers, ecosystems or animals be 
redressed and restored as a consequence of the harm suffered?  
These questions and reflections seem to have resonated with the transitional justice 
architecture. In recent years, the Investigation and Prosecution Unit of the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace declared the environment as “a silent victim of the armed conflict” in the framework of an 
investigation carried out in the south of the country (Nariño Department). The Unit asserted “to be 
seeking [environmental] reparation mechanisms and guarantees of non-repetition.”101 
The rights of nature have already been mentioned in other Units of the SJP.102 But, 
remarkably, transitional judges have recognized the malfunction of antagonism or dualism 
between society and nature and have instead promoted a more intertwined conversation between 
these worlds. They have emphasized the notion of territory as a victim.103 Territory refers to “a 
living whole and sustenance of identity and harmony.” In accordance with indigenous ontologies, 
“territory” denotes no separation between the material, the cultural, and the spiritual spheres, and 
human and nonhuman are interrelated and interdependent.104 Based on this, the SJP, one of the 
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most diverse tribunals in the world regarding gender and ethnicity,105 has issued several decisions 
recognizing territories as victims of the armed conflict. According to recent decisions, the Katsa 
Su and the Cxhab Wala Kile territories of the indigenous Awá and Nasa peoples, respectively,106 
as well as territories of the afro-colombian communities from Tumaco, Ricaurte and Barbacoas107 
municipalities are subjects of rights. These decisions have been accompanied by other recent ones 
in the cases of Eperara Euja territory of Eperara Siapidaara people and other nine indigenous 
people and communities.108 
Although a close examination of the case law in Colombia shows that there is no unique, 
standardized, or uniform content of the “rights of nature,” and several challenges remains in its 
implementation, this approach might be a promising path to fill the gaps of transitional justice 
mechanisms and guarantee justice, truth, reparations, and non-recurrence, also, for territories, 
rivers, and animals. 
 
Conclusion 
This Article examined the effects that corporate abuse in post-conflict Colombia had and 
continues to have over land, rivers and animals. The devices of dispossession, exploitation, and 
domination were not eliminated after the signature of the Peace Agreement, and anthropocentric 
and corporate-centric logics continue to dominate. Land grabbing, abuse of animals,  material 
pollution and moral or symbolic contamination of rivers were some of the mechanisms that reigned 
during the war, many of which have not been eliminated. The very different types of personhood 
that corporations and non-human bodies and territories enjoy have very real consequences: the 
lack of incentives for economic actors to join the transitional justice regime is causing an impunity 
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crisis, in which animals, rivers, and land remain unredressed. While corporate actors enjoy many 
rights of legal personhood and few of the responsibilities they would have to face were they natural 
persons, non-human bodies and territories face an ongoing battle to achieve protection through 
some kind of personhood. Hence, this Article also explored the accountability efforts beyond and 
within transitional justice mechanisms. Both national and international activists and attorneys have 
been seeking corporate accountability for economic actors, and local law has made huge advances 
in enhancing the rights of nature to addressing harms to territories, rivers, and animals as victims 
of conflict. While human and non-human victims keep pointing at extractivism as one of the main 
causes and effects of the war, legal and illegal corporate power continues to disguise these effects 
through speeches of economic and human development. But the idyllic view of a post-conflict 
Colombia, strongly in doubt after the wave of protests in the country,109 is increasingly raising 
novel legal battles demanding protection and reparations. A post-conflict society must find a space 
for those who it considers “wild”, and being worthy of state protection should be extended to the 
life of every animal, to the life of every human, and to the lives that rivers have shared, enhanced, 
and buried.  
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